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Article 2

THE DILEMMA OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER
IN THE POST-REVOLUTIONARY ERA
Anton-Hermann Chroust*
On the eve of the Revolution the legal profession in the American colonies,'
in the main, had achieved both distinction and recognition. It had come to
enjoy the respect as well as the confidence of the people at large. This is borne
out, for instance, by the fact that twenty-five of the fifty-six signers of the
Declaration of Independence, and thirty-one of the fifty-five members of the
Constitutional Convention were lawyers. Of the thirty-one lawyers who attended
the Constitutional Convention, no less than five had studied law in England.2
The American Revolution itself, directly and indirectly, affected the legal
profession in a variety of ways. First, the profession itself lost a considerable
number of its most prominent members; secondly, a bitter antipathy against the
lawyer as a class soon made itself felt throughout the country; thirdly, a strong
dislike of everything English, including the English common law became widespread; and fourthly, the lack of a distinct body of American law as well as the
absence of American law reports and law books for a while made the administration of justice extremely difficult and haphazard.
Aside from the fact that a great many lawyers took an active part in the
Revolution either as fighting men - usually they held a commission in the militia
- or as politicians, the profession was sorely depleted by the defection of many
lawyers, among them some of the most outstanding men in the profession, who
decided to remain loyal to the British Crown. These Loyalists either completely
retired from practice or left America. It has been estimated that in Massachusetts alone at least seventeen prominent lawyers, not counting judges, fled the
country: Jonathan Sewall, Timothy Ruggles, Benjamin Kent, Samuel Fitch,
Jeremiah Dummer Rogers, Benjamin Gridley, Samuel Quincy, Andrew Cazeneau, Samuel Sewall, Abel Willard, James Putnam, Samuel Porter, Daniel
Leonhard, Pelham Winslow, Jonathan Adams, Sampson Salter Blowers and
Rufus Chandler. Several other lawyers, among them Joseph Howley and John
Worthington, assumed a position of neutrality in the general conflict and gave
up the practice of law. William Sullivan describes this situation vividly though
not always accurately:'

*
1

University Graduate Research Professor and Professor of Law, University of Notre Dame.
See also Chroust, The Legal Profession in Colonial America, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 51,
350 (1957); 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 44 (1958).
2 Also ten of the twenty-nine Senators and seventeen of the sixty-five Representatives in
the First Congress were lawyers.
3

SULLIVAN, AN ADDRESS TO THE MEMBERS OF THE BAR OF SUFFOLK, MASS. 39 (1825).

This address was delivered in March, 1824, at the "stated meeting" of the Suffolk Bar.
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There were then [scil.,
at the outbreak of the Revolution] in the
whole Province [scil., Massachusetts] thirty-six barristers' and twelve
attorneys, 5 practising in the superior court. These, in common with
all other persons, were driven to the necessity of deciding, whether
they would adhere to the royal cause, or take the fearful chance of
assisting to rescue the country from its oppressors, on failure of the
common effort, to be treated as rebellious subjects. Of those who
took the side of their country, sixteen survived the Revolution....
Thirteen of them were royalists, and left the country

...

Some

who remained were neutral, so far as they could be, consistently
with safety.... Such effect had the Revolution on the members
of the [Massachusetts] bar, that the list of 1779 comprized only ten
barristers, and four attorneys, for the whole state; who were such
before the Revolution.7
In other colonies, too, the Revolution caused many losses to the legal profession. Through defections to the Loyalist cause Connecticut, for instance, was
deprived of the services of Amos Botsford, Joshua Chandler, Feyler Dibblee
(attorney), Thomas Fitch, Nathan Frink and Jared Ingersoll. Georgia lost
Anthony Stokes, and Maryland saw the departure of George Chalmers, Daniel
Dulany, Lloyd Dulany and Charles Gordon (attorney). New Jersey, where
many prominent lawyers became Tories, lost Ozias Ansley, Isaac Allen, John
Brown Lawrence, David Ogden, Henry Waddell, Frederick Smyth, Cortland
Skinner (the last Royal Attorney General), William Franklin (the last Royal
Chief Justice) and William Taylor. New York' was deprived of the professional

4 At that time there were actually forty-four barristers in Massachusetts whose names can
still be ascertained. Of these forty-four barristers, twelve practiced in Boston (Suffolk), namely,
James Otis, Jr., William Read, Samuel Quincy, Benjamin Kent, Richard Dana, Andrew Cazeneau,
Samuel Fitch, Benjamin Gridley, Samuel Swift, John Adams, Robert Auchmuty and Sampson
Salter Blowers; five in Essex, namely, John Chipman, Daniel Farnham, John Lowell, William
Pynchon and Nathaniel Peaslee Sargent; three in Bristol, namely, Robert Treat Paine, Daniel
Leonhard and Samuel White; two in Plymouth, namely, James Hovey and Pelham Winslow;
three in Worcester, namely, Rufus Chandler, James Putnam and Abel Willard; three in
Springfield, namely, Moses Bliss, Jonathan Bliss and John Worthington; two in Cambridge,
namely, Francis Dana and William Brattle; two in Great Barrington, namely, Mark Hopkins
and David Ingersoll; and one each in Braintree (Jonathan Adams), North Hampton (Joseph
Hawley), Concord (Daniel Bliss), Barnstable (Shearjahub Bourne), Littleton (Jeremiah D.
Rogers), Taunton (Zephaniah Leonhard), Amherst (Simeon Strong), Hardwick (Daniel
Oliver), Charleston (Thomas Danford), Bridgewater (COakes Augier), Brookfield (Joshua
Upham), and Middlesex (Jonathan Sewall).
5 There were at least fourteen outstanding attorneys at the time, namely, Josiah Quincy,
Theodore Sedgwick, Isaac Mansfield, David Gorham, Samuel Sewall, Edward -Pope, Timothy
Langdon, John Sprague, Edward Winslow, Jr., Woodbridge Little, James Boutineau, David
Porter, Ebenezar Bradish and Elijah Williams.
6 The actual count is at least seventeen, and possibly more. See text, supra.
7 The "anti-revolutionary bar" of Massachusetts and New York furnished the admiralty
and common law courts of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Canada and the Bermudas with many
of their most distinguished lawyers and judges. William Smith, the Chief Justice of New York,
attained to the same office in Canada. Daniel Bliss, Joshua Upham, Edward Winslow, Ward
Chipman, Jonathan Sewall, Jonathan Bliss and James Putnam were appointed to the bench in
New Brunswick. Foster Hutchinson and Sampson Salter Blowers were on the bench in Nova
Scotia. William Hutchinson became King's Counsel in the Bahamas, Samuel Quincy King's
Attorney in Antigua, Daniel Leonard Chief Justice in the Bermudas, and Jonathan Stearns
Attorney General of Nova Scotia. For details, see generally, SABINE, THE AMERICAN LOYALISTS
(1847). Sabine believes that the majority of the lawyers were Whigs, and that comparatively
few lawyers adhered to the Crown. This statement is not supported by the facts. The record
shows that many of the eminent members of the bench and bar were Loyalists, although not
all of them by any means.
8 The legislature of New York passed an act on October 9, 1779, "suspending from prac-
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services of Thomas Barclay, Crean Brush, Benjamin Hilton (attorney), John
Tabor Kempe, Benjamin Kissam, George Duncan Ludlow, Lindley Murray,
Isaac Ogden, William Smith and Peter Van Schaack.9 From North Carolina
departed Edmund Fanning, George Hooper and Henry Eustace McCulloch.
Pennsylvania lost William Allen, Andrew Allen, Isaac Allen, Miers Fisher,
Joseph Galloway and Christian Huck. Rhode Island lost James Brenton, James
Honeyman, Robert Lightfoot, Matthew Robinson and William B. Simpson.
South Carolina was deprived of the services of Thomas Knox Gordon, William
Gregory, Egerton Leigh, John Savage, James Simpson and William Wragg, 0
and Virginia lost John Randolph and John Warden. It would not be amiss
to estimate that one hundred and fifty lawyers of prominence and another two
hundred lawyers of lesser standing left the country or retired from active practice.
Perhaps one-third of the legal profession became political refugees on account of
the Revolution which "left a huge gap in what had become a great body of
lawyers." 11
The position of the American legal profession was further jeopardized
by a disastrous and widespread economic depression which followed in the
wake of the Revolution. The economy of the young Republic was in a chaotic
state; and large segments of the population were restless and frequently disappointed with the results of the war. As is so often the case after a protracted
conflict, business was thoroughly disrupted and even at a complete stand-still in
certain areas, and unemployment and general poverty were rampant. The
closing of the ports by the British Navigation Acts as well as prohibitory duties in
effect cut off the one time profitable West-Indian trade. High prices and enormous public debts necessitating confiscatory taxation all but ruined the country's
economy. The paper money issued by the Government was worthless, and in
many instances people refused to, accept it. A paralyzing inability to pay debts
soon set in. The new federal government owed its soldiers large sums of money.
People with property were "property-poor," while those who had organized
businesses were unable to meet their obligations. Loyalists or Tories, under the
terms of the peace treaty, were reclaiming their estates, despite confiscatory
legislation which frequently was ignored by the courts."' English creditors and
their agents were making strenuous efforts to recover old claims barred by various
statutes of confiscation and sequestration. Debts, therefore, plagued the country.
tice all attorneys, solicitors, and counsellors at law, who had been licensed previous to April,
1777, to practice in any of the courts of law or equity of the former colony of New York."
This suspension could only be removed if a jury found that the application for re-admission
had been "a good and zealous friend of the American cause." In March, 1785, an attempt
was made to procure a repeal of this act, at least so far as it affected certain respected members of the profession. This attempt, however, proved unsuccessful.
9 Peter Van Schaak, who had revised the statutes of colonial New York, was excluded by
the act of 1779. See note 8, supra. He was re-admitted, however, in April 1786. VAN
SCi-AAK, THE LIFE OF PETER VAN

SCHAAx 400, 402-03

(1842).

After his re-admission,

Peter Van Schaak turned his attention to teaching rather than the practice of law.
10 Since the majority of the better South Carolina lawyers had been trained in the Inns of
Court where some of them developed a strong attachment to the Crown cf. Chroust, The
Legal Profession in Colonial America, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 44 (1958), it must be assumed
that many more of these so-called "South Carolina Templars" left the country.
11 POUND, THE LAWYER FROrM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIsEs 174 (1953).
Ila Cf. Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].)

158 (1796).
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Jefferson estimated Virginia alone owed between ten and fifteen million dollars
to British merchants. During the war, of course, payment to Englishmen had
been suspended by law. But the peace treaty contained a clause providing that
bona fide debts could be collected. Popular feeling ran high on this issue, especially since British debts threatened to absorb what little money was left. British
merchants before the war had been extremely generous with credit, and the
colonial planters and businessmen frequently had made it a practice to wipe out
one debt by incurring another, often without bothering to keep books on them.
Now the old issue of debts to British creditors was revived and the agents of
these British creditors put in an appearance in the American courts to press
their claims.
This general economic depression probably was at its worst in 1785. The
states had stopped issuing paper money for a short time, but this measure did
not add any stability to the old notes. Money grew extremely scarce at a time
when a real extension of credit was sorely needed to start up the national economy. In addition, although commerce began to revive somewhat in 1786, it
suffered much from the commercial rivalry between the several states. In
western Massachusetts the discontent arising from these economic conditions
led to an organized uprising-known as Shay's rebellion-which was
directed against taxes and debts, and, unfortunately, against the unpopular courts
and lawyers. 2 Debtors found the obvious symbols of all their calamities and
burdens in the lawyers and the courts through which their creditors moved in on
them. Hence the many efforts, often supported by legislative acts, to close the
courts by force and drive out the lawyers. When the frontier moved westward
during the early decades of the nineteenth century, this suspicion of the courts
and the lawyers was carried along. The new states, to be sure, set up courts as
a matter of fact, but their readiness of accepting judicial institutions did by no
means imply that they regarded judges above popular control or suspicion.
Plainly the pioneers held some very pragmatic views of the role to be assigned
to the courts, and they generally insisted on the election of all judges by popular
vote: in Kentucky, for instance, there raged a fierce contest over the election of
a supreme court which could be relied upon to stay debts.
The prevailing laws of strict foreclosure and imprisonment for debt created
12 "The circumstances of the country, from the peace of 1783, to the adoption of the
Federal Constitution, were- exceedingly oppressive. In such times, professional agency has a
very direct relation to real or imaginary evils. This vice of the times, or the unwelcome operations of government are referred to those whose duty it is to aid, in coercing the performance
of contracts, or in the furnishing a legal remedy for wrongs. Our profession was most reproachfully assailed by newspaper essayists; and even the legislature entertained projects of
reform in practice .... " SULLIVAN, op. Cit. supra note 3, at 48. - The lawyers and the
courts also came under strong attack in the so-called Whiskey Insurrection which in 1794 broke
out in western Pennsylvania over the enforcement of a federal excise tax on domestic spirits.
The anti-rent riots in New York (1839-1846) likewise did not contribute to the general popularity of the legal profession and the courts. While much of the widespread dissatisfaction
with the early courts stemmed from charges that they were "undemocratic," there were also
many (and, indeed, well-deserved) complaints about the slowness with which the courts performed their tasks. In time these complaints and charges effected extensive alterations in the
judicial systems of several states. For the charge that the courts were "undemocratic," see,
for instance, CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 168-69 (1918). Carpenter also points out that the alleged "undemocratic deportment of the courts in many instances were considered the result of long tenure (which turned judges into a privileged class),
as well as of the fact that they were appointed rather than elected by the people."
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widespread individual hardship."3 Hence, it was only natural that in keeping
with the popular tendency always to confound cause and effect, the lawyers
especially should be singled out as the real villains. The chief law business of
this period, to be sure, was the collection of debts, foreclosures, insolvencies, and
the recovery of property - a type of professional activity which, aside from
attracting inferior and unscrupulous men, has always been unpopular with the
public at large. Whenever the common man came into contact with the law,
the legal profession or the law courts, whether this contact involved a dispute
over a personal note, a squabble over farm boundaries, a tax collection case, or
a sheriff's sale, his experience was not likely to be always a happy one; for he
often got less satisfaction from this encounter than he had anticipated in his lay
mind. Dependent upon the law but antagonistic to the alleged pretentions of
its servants, he became greatly exasperated at "the slow trials, heavy costs...
frequent misusages of justice," 14 and the often disappointing outcome of his
recourse to law. In addition, the prevailing system of lawyer's fees and court
costs established by the various local bar associations aroused much indignation.
When the lawyers, because of their training and experience began to assume an
active and in some instances a commanding role in the political life of the
country, they were frequently attacked with great vehemence."5 The hostility to
the lawyer to some degree delayed the adoption of the new Federal Constitution.
Much of the opposition to the proposed constitution which was voiced by the
several state conventions between 1787 and 1789 stemmed from the fact that
it was considered the work of lawyers. "Beware of the lawyers," warned the
New York Daily Advertiser. "Of the men who framed the monarchical,
tyrannical, diabolical system of slavery, the New Constitution, one half were
lawyers. Of the men who represented, or rather misrepresented this city [scil.,
New York] and county in the late [scil., constitutional] convention of this state,
to whose wicked arts we may chiefly attribute the adoption of the abominable
system, seven out of nine were lawyers. ' ' l 5a
This antagonistic sentiment naturally also involved the courts which likewise
came under much adverse criticism throughout this period. It was this sentiment
which subsequently became one of the chief obstacles to the development of a
strong judicial system during the early period of American history. Also the
fact that only lawyers seemed to be busy and prosperous while nearly everyone
else was perforce idle or in dire economic straits added to the general distrust
and dislike of the legal profession. It was not realized that lawyers invariably
have a great many "clean-up-jobs" during and immediately after an economic
13 "In the county of Worcester [Massachusetts], then containing a population of less than
fifty thousand souls, there were two thousand actions [for debt] on the dockets of its Common
Pleas." 1 AMORY, LIFE OF JAMES SULLIVAN 186 (1859).
14 FEE, THE TRANSITION FROM ARISTOCRACY TO DEMOCRACY IN NEw JERSEY, 1789-1829,
107 (1933).
15 In some instances lawyers who entered politics were denounced as "almost the sole
dictators of public life." Their influence was called "improper and dangerous," and one man,
from South Jersey, announced that he would not vote for any lawyer "as these men were
interested in fomenting disputes and belonged in a class with Tories, liars, drunkards and
adulterers." FEE, op. cit. supra note 14, at 107-08.
15a New York Daily Advertiser, March 4, 1789. See also Fox, New York Becomes a
STATE OF NEW YoRK 6-7 (Flickled. 1934).
Democracy, 6 HISTORY OF T
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depression. This sort of business comes to some lawyers when other men are

conspicuously not busy or not profiteering. Since the lawyer as a rule would do
nothing without a retainer, he soon waxed rich and this prosperity soon marked
him as a fit subject for the discontented to vent their anger on. The lawyers
"were denounced as banditti, as blood-suckers, as pickpockets, as windbags, as
smooth-tongued rogues..... The mere sight of a lawyer.., was enough to call
forth an oath.... " Authors dealing with the economic conditions of the times
agree that a violent universal prejudice existed against the legal profession as a
whole. Lawyers were called
plants that will grow in any soil that is cultivated by the hands
of others - men who derive their fortunes from the misfortunes
of people and amass more wealth without labour, than the most
opulent farmer with all his toils.... What a pity that our forefathers, who happily extinguished so many fatal customs . . .did
not also prevent the inttoduction of a set of men so dangerous:1
Public sentiment was also inflamed by radical elements who excoriated
the common law of England as "rags of despotism"; and the judges or magistrates
who followed the common law were denounced as "tyrants, sycophants,
oppressors of the people, and enemies of liberty."' 8
Contemporary journalism likewise joined in this general condemnation of
the profession. The New York papers, for instance, were filled with exhortations, written in the style of the hangman, beseeching all true patriots to beware
of the sinister machinations of the lawyers - "men so audacious," according to
the press, "that they venture, even in public, to wrest, turn, twist, and explain
away the purport and meaning of our laws." "9 These men, it was alleged, are
the bane of society; "and of all aristocracies, that of the lawyers is the worst." 20
Another paper called upon the electors to refuse lawyers public office, and still
another suggested the complete abolition of the legal profession. A knowledge
of the law was held to be the best reason in the world why a man should be
disqualified for public office. The animadversion against the lawyer found its
official expression in a bill proposed, but finally rejected in New York, to throw
open the profession to all persons of good character, to fix the fees of attorneys,
and to restrain all forms of champerty. The people of New Hampshire insisted
that the legal profession was the cause of all their misfortunes. It was maintained that the lawyers were grinding the faces of the poor, that they grew rich
while their neighbors approached beggary, and that their fees were exorbitant
and their number too great. The farmers of Vermont resolved that all "At16

1 MCMASTER, HISTORY OF THE PEOPLE OF THE UNITED STATES 302 (1927).
17 CRiVEconuR, LETTERS PROBE AN AMERICAN FARMER 141 (1787) (Everyman's Library).
18 PoUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 116-17 (1921).
19 1 MCMASTER, op. cit. supra note 16, at 254.
20 Id. In 1835 Tocqueville wrote: "The special information which lawyers derive from
their studies ensures them a separate station in society; and they constitute a sort of privileged
body in the scale of intelligence.... In America there are no nobles or literary men, and the
people are apt to mistrust the wealthy; lawyers consequently form the highest political class
and the most cultivated circle of society.... If I were asked where I place the American
Aristocracy, I should reply without hesitation, that it is not composed of the rich, who are
united by no common tie, but that it occupies the judicial bench and the bar." 1 DEMOCRACY
IN AMERICA 278 (Bradley ed., 1945). See also 2 BRYCE, THE AMERICAN COMMONWEALTH

306 (1913).
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torneys whose eternal gabble, 11Confounds the inexperienced rabble," as one
contemporary "poet" puts it,"' should be expelled from the courts, and all debts
cancelled. A newspaper called upon all lawyers to have a care, and lawyers on
the whole were referred to as outright nuisances. Cries went up, "kill the
lawyer," but Chittenden, the Governor of Vermont, conceded that while this
might be desirable, it would be but a temporary cure in that it did not and
could not remove the real cause of the general distress.
Efforts to restrain, suppress and even to abolish the legal profession throughout the young Republic were also voiced by private persons. Benjamin Austin,
who wrote under the nom de plume of Honestus,22 in 1786 maintained that all
contemporary evils besetting the people could be traced back to the lawyers.
Hence, he suggested that the legal profession be "annihilated," that no lawyer
"should be admitted to speak in court," and that "the order [of lawyers] be
abolished as not only a useless but a dangerous body to the public." 2 3 Even
members of the profession itself, such as John Gardiner of Massachusetts, very
much to the discomfort of their brethren, advanced a proposal for a thorough
reform of the bar. 4" Benjamin Austin flatly demanded in his much publicized
writings 5 that a State Advocate-General should appear on behalf of persons
indicted for a crime; that parties were to appear in person or by a friend whether
the latter was an attorney or not, and that boards of referees should take the
place of courts. As an outspoken anti-Federalist, in 1801 Austin also attacked
the very idea of federal courts, remarking that these courts tend to increase the
number of lawyers "in ten-fold proportion to other professions.... [1]n time," he
contended, "the country would be .. . overrun by this 'order' as Egypt with
Mamelukes." 28
John Quincy Adams, in 1787, observed in his Diary that the legal profession of Massachusetts was laboring "under the heavy weight of public indignation"; and that it was "upbraided as the original cause of all the evils" which
21 1 MCMASTER, op. Cit. supra note 16, at 344.
22 See also AMORY, op. cit. supra note 13, at 188 (1859). Benjamin Austin's (1752-1820)
"article" originally appeared under the title of Observations on the Pernicious Practice of the
Law by Honestus as Published occasionally in Independent Chronicle in Boston, of April 20,
1786. This "article" was printed in several "installments" in the Boston Independent Chronicle
from March 9 to June 15, 1786. A Digest was then made of this "article" which was published as Observations an the Pernicious Practice of Law. A second edition was published in
1819. - Needless to say, the proposals of Austin were assailed by the lawyers, and he was
accused of fomenting Shay's Rebellion which broke out in 1786. Resentful of these charges
he became even more extreme in his expressions and proposals. His views were well received
by the masses in Boston. John Quincy Adams describes a town meeting in Boston attended by
about seven hundred of Austin's followers "who looked as if they had been collected from all the
jails on the continent ...

"

4
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63 (2nd series).
23 HONESTUS (Austin), op. cit. supra note 22, at 11 (Digest of 1819). Compare this
statement with what one speaker had to say during the debates of the Indiana Constitutional
Convention of 1850: "Gentlemen of the bar seem to think that hard things are said here of
those who oppose this salutary reform. But let me say to these honorable gentlemen that this
is a reform for which the PEOPLE call - a reform that the people's INTEREST demands,
and those gentlemen will hear a voice from the people, ere long, which will tell them in tones
of muttering thunder, that 'the day of their powers that be, are numbered.'" 2 REPORTS OF
THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1823 (1850).
24 PARSONS, MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS 162 (1859).
25 HONESTUS, op. cit. supra note 23.

26

Ibid.
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besat the Commonwealth: "when the legislatures have been publicly exhorted
by a popular writer [Benjamin Austin, alias. "Honestus"] to abolish it entirely,
and when the mere title of lawyer is sufficient to deprive a man of the public
confidence, it should seem this profession would afford but a poor subject of
panegyric." But Adams consoles himself with the thought that the future as
well as the status of the legal profession will "not be determined by the shortlived frenzy of an inconsiderate multitude, nor by the artful misrepresentation
of an insidious writer.""7 In another place Adams laments
that the popular odium which has been excited against the
practitioners in this Commonwealth prevails to so great a degree
that the most innocent and irreproachable life cannot guard a
lawyer against the hatred of his fellow citizens. The very despicable writings of Honestus were just calculated to kindle a flame
which will subsist long after they are forgotten ....
[T]he poison
has been so extensively communicated that its infection will not
easily be stopped. A thousand lies in addition to those published
in the papers have been spread all over the country to prejudice
the people against the 'order,' as it has invidiously been called,
and . . . the gentlemen of the profession have been treated with
contemptuous neglect and with insulting abuse.28
In 1803 Charles Jared Ingersoll of Philadelphia, himself a prominent
lawyer, reported that "our State rulers threaten to lop away that excrescence
on civilization, the Bar," 29 while William Duane, a journalist in Philadelphia,
ranted about "the furrago of finesse and intricacy and abstruseness" by which
lawyers had degraded the law of the land. In a pamphlet which carried the
formidable title of Sampson Against the Philistines or the Reformation of Lawsuits and Justice made cheap, speedy and brought home to every man's door
agreeable to the Principles of the Ancient Trial by Jury before the same was
innovated by Judges and Lawyers, published in 1804-05, this Duane spoke about
the loose principles of persons of that profession [the legal proc
fession]; their practice of defending right and wrong indifferently
for reward; their open enmity to the principles of free government,
because free government is irreconcilable to the abuses upon which
they thrive; the tyranny which they display in the courts; and in
too many cases the obvious . . . collusion which prevails among the
members of the bench, the-bar, and the officers of the court....
[He then suggests that these alleged abuses~demand the more serious
interference of the legislature and the jearoba-y, of the people,
. . . [especially since the lawyers] so manage justice asto._engross
the general property to themselves through the medium of-gation; and the misfortune is that to be able to effect this point,
it is attended by loss of time, by delay, expense, ill blood, bad
habits, lessons of fraud and temptation to villainy, crimes, punishments, loss of estate, character and soul, public burden, and even
loss of national character.
William Duane continues: "So long as justice can be demanded only by
professional lawyers, so long will the knowledge of it [scil., the law] be the ex27 Diary of John Quincy Adams, 16
291, 343 (2d series 1902).
28 Ibid. at 358.
29

MEiGs, LIFE OF JARED INGERSOLL

MASSACHUSETTS

14 (1897).
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clusive property of the profession... ."" To remedy all these evils, he proposed
a series of radical reforms which, if fully carried out, ultimately would have
resulted in the abolition of the legal profession: all trials were to be held before
local or county tribunals in order to expedite justice, with practically no right to
appeal; lawyers, if they were to be admitted at all, should be appointed and
paid for by the government, and then only in order to assist the litigants; and
a system of arbitration by laymen should replace, wherever feasible, the courts
of law."
The widespread and popular aversion to the legal profession 2 assumed a
variety of forms in the several states. In Vermont and New Hampshire vociferous demands were made to suppress the legal profession completely, or at
least to reduce the number of lawyers and, incidentally, to cut down substantially
the usual legal fees. In Vermont, where the people apparently were particularly
vehement in their actions, court houses were set afire; in New Hampshire some
people even advanced the ridiculous proposition that all courts be abolished.
This will also explain why the Vermont legislature arrogated to itself the right
to set aside or modify court decisions, or grant new trials over the heads of
the courts." In New Jersey debtors nailed up the doors of the court houses, and
irate mobs attacked lawyers on the streets. In Rhode Island lawyers were compelled by the state legislature under penalty of disbarment to accept paper money
at par, although a previous act providing for compulsory payment of debts in
paper money had been held unconstitutional. Massachusetts, which on the eve
of the Revolution could boast of one of the most outstanding and best organized
bars in America, also seems to have become extremely hostile to the legal profession. In 1785 and again in 1786, acts were passed by the General Court
to the effect that parties to a litigation were to be permitted to plead their own
cases in court. Also, no party was to employ more than two lawyers at one
time. Subsequently an act was passed authorizing parties to a litigation to
appoint as their attorney any person irrespective of whether this particular
person had duly been admitted to practice. And in 1790 the General Court
proposed a thorough investigation of the "present state of the law and its professors." As early as 1786, the town of Braintree in Massachusetts passed a
resolve "to crush" or, at least, to restxaip "fltt-order of Gentlemen denominated
Lawyers... whose... coudtrt
d ppears ...to tend rather to the destruction
than the preservytiom of this Commonwealth";34 and the town of Dedham reported -thatitf-was aware of the universally prevailing complaints against the
lawyers. The town felt that by their "unreasonable and extravagant exactions"
30 Quoted in WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 223 (1911).
31 Ibid. DUANE, SAMPSON AGAINST THE PHILISTINES 36-42 (1804-1805).
32 See note 15a supra.
33 The impeachment proceedings against Justice Samuel Chase are also in point. William
Branch Giles of Virginia, the spokesman for the extreme Jeffersonian position, stated the real
issue of these proceedings as follows: ". . . if the Judges of the Supreme 'Court should dare,
AS THEY HAD DONE, to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional . . . it was the undoubted right of the House of Representatives to impeach them, and of the Senate to remove
them, for giving such opinions, however honest or sincere they may have been in entertaining
them. .. ." 1 MEMOmS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS 322 (Adams ed., 1874).
34 Diary of John Quincy Adams, 16 MASSACHUSETTS HISTORICAL SOCIETY PROCEEDINGS
(2d series) 291, 342 (1902); 2 ADAMS, THREE EPISODES OF MASSACHUSETTS HISTORY 897
(1896).
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the lawyers were guilty of a "pernicious" and "unconstitutional" conduct.
Hence, Dedham instructed its representative in the General Court (the State's
legislative body) to initiate legislation for the restraint of the legal profession,
and, if necessary, "to endeavor that the order of Lawyers be totally abolished; an
alternative preferable to their continuing in their present mode." 5 In Pennsylvania several statutes were passed to repress not only the profession but also the
common law and the existing system of courts. These acts provided for lay
referees in place of trained judges, and for trials without intervention of counsel.
Parties were to file informally a statement in court, and the adversary's rejoinder
was likewise to be informal. As a matter of fact, the situation in Pennsylvania
became so threatening to the bar that Charles Jared Ingersoll of Philadelphia
informed his friends that all the eminent lawyers in Philadelphia "have their
eyes on one city or another to remove to in case of extremes." He added that
his own father, Jared Ingersoll, a barrister of the Middle Temple, and one of
the most distinguished Philadelphia lawyers in an age when this city boasted the
finest legal talent of the country, planned to transfer his practice to New York."
At the same time the practice of law and the many opportunities it afforded
during these troubled years still seemed to be the most honorable and, it may
be added, the most promising and attractive profession open to young men of
ambition and talent.
After the peace of 1783 . . . a few gentlemen of the colonial
school resumed their ancient practice; but the Bar was chiefly
supplied by a number of ambitious and high-spirited young men,
who had returned from the field of arms with honorable distinction,
and by extraordinary application, they soon became qualified to
commence their career at the Bar [of New York] with distinguished
reputation .... 37
Alexander Hamilton, for instance, prepared for the practice of law by
intensive reading for a period of three months under the tutelage of Robert
Troup."8 At the July term of the New York Superior Court in 1782 he was
admitted to practice as an attorney, and in October of 1782 granted the additional license of a counsellor. Despite this abbreviated preparation for the
bar, Hamilton, because of his outstanding mental gifts, soon became a brilliant
and successful lawyer.
But there is another side to this story. Alexander Hamilton's less talented
contemporaries, who had been admitted to practice after the same scanty
preparation, on the whole proved to be little qualified for the profession." Much
of the work which should have been done by responsible and experienced professional men was taken over by sharpers and pettifoggers; in fact, a large segment
of the young American bar was made up of men who had but a sketchy acquaintance with the law and with the standards required of an honorable profession.
As early as 1768 the Essex bar in Massachusetts enacted a rule, later adopted
35 Quoted in COHEN, THE LAw: BusINEss OR PROFESSION 27 (1924).
36 MEIGS, op. cit. supra note 29, at 14.
37 KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT 1763-1847, 31 (1898).
38 SCHACHNER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 145 (1946). In his private reading Hamilton
had already become familiar with Blackstone, Grotius and Puffendorf.
39 Cf. CLARK, MEMOIR OF JEREmrAH MASON 22 (1917): "Most of the members of the
bar were poorly educated, and of vulgar manners and indifferent morals."
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by other Massachusetts county bars, that no person be admitted to the practice
of law without the consent and recommendation of the bar. In particular, it
was provided that no person be admitted as an attorney in the inferior courts
who had not studied law with some lawyer for at least three years; and that
any person to be admitted as an attorney to the Superior Court must have been
an attorney of good standing in the inferior courts for at least two years. Any
person wishing to become a barrister must have been an attorney in the Superior
Court for at least two years. 9' During the Revolution, as may well be expected,
this particular rule was not always strictly enforced. Thus, Christopher Gore,
subsequently an outstanding lawyer and Governor of Massachusetts, in 1778
was considered to have studied law according to the rules of the Essex Bar
since July, 1776, although his main activities were those of a patriot rather
than of a law student."b In 1779 Fisher Ames, although he was living in Dedham
at the time, was considered as having been a student under the tutelage of
Mr. Tudor of Boston since January 1, provided that at the expiration of three
years from January 1, 1779 he was still in the office of Mr. Tudor. He was
also ordered to submit then to an examination by the Essex Bar "in the practical
business of the bar."39 In 1783 a Richard Brook Roberts of South Carolina was
admitted as a student in the office of Mr. Hichborn "with a deduction of one
year from the usual term required by the rules for such students," provided he
could produce a certificate from a South Carolina lawyer to the effect that he
had studied law for at least one year in this lawyer's office.s"' In 1806 Massachusetts laid down the rule that graduates from out-of-state colleges would have
to study one year more than graduates from Harvard."
The New Hampshire bar, in 1788 and again in 1805, adopted some rules
concerning the admission to legal study and to the bar. - These rules provided
that a candidate for admission to a law office must be duly qualified to be
enrolled in Dartmouth college as a first-year student. A non-college student
was required to study in a law office for at least five years, while a college
graduate had to take only three years of legal training within the state. 4 Also,
no lawyer was to be admitted to the bar of the Superior Court of New Hampshire until he had practiced for at least two years in the Court of Common
Pleas. In Vermont, under the statute of 1787, the term of legal study was two
years," and in Connecticut and Rhode Island two years were prescribed for
college graduates and three years for persons without college training. 43 In
Vermont, as in Rhode Island, any candidate for admission to practice had to
have the approbation of the local bar.
With the adoption of the New York Constitution of 1777, the admission
39a 2 ADAMS, LIFE AND WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 197 (1885). Cf. Record-Book of the Suffolk Bar, 16 PROCEEDINGS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS HSTORICAL SoCIETY 749 (1881-1882).
39b Ibid. at 152.
39c Ibid. at 153.
39d Ibid. at 157.
40 Apparently the lawyers of Massachusetts, who were mostly graduates from Harvard
College, did not think too highly of the education offered in other colleges.
41 CLARK, op. cit. supra note 39, at 23.
42 CLARK, op. cit. supra note 39, at 21.
43 The Connecticut rule, which dates back to the year 1795, was established by custom,
but in 1807 became a rule of the Supreme Court.
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to practice was regulated by the provision that all attorneys, solicitors and
counsellors should be appointed and licensed by the court in which they intended
.
to practice. By rule of the Supreme Court of 1797," it was further provided that
candidates for admission to practice must have served a regular seven-year
clerkship with a practicing lawyer, but a period not exceeding four years devoted
to classical studies (college) after one had attained the age of fourteen years
might be accepted as partial fulfillment of the required seven year period of
45
clerkship. After four years of practice (modified in 1804 to three years) as
an attorney, or after four years of study under a professor or counsellor (also
modified in 1804)," a person might be admitted as a counsellor to practice
In 1829 the rules for admission were further
before the Supreme Court."
amended to the effect that an attorney should be admitted as counsel, not as a
matter of right after four (or three) years, but only if he were found to be duly
qualified. In New Jersey, a candidate for admission to the practice of law had
to be recommended by the judges of the Supreme Court to the Governor who
licensed him, provided the candidate had served a clerkship of three years if a
college graduate, or four years if a non-graduate. He also had to pass an
examination before a committee of three out of the twelve serjeants who composed the uppermost level of the New Jersey legal profession. 8
In Delaware as well as in Maryland, three years of law study was required.
In Maryland in particular, this study had to be under the supervision of a
practicing lawyer or judge, and the candidate had to submit to an examination
by two members of the bar. How deplorably lax, in the main, these examinations could be may be gathered from the following account: in Kentucky a
candidate was unable to give one single correct answer. Nevertheless, he was
admitted on the ground stated officially by the court that "no one would employ
him anyhow." The question of character fitness was duly met by the statement
that he "had never fought a duel with deadly weapons either in the state or
In Virginia
without the state with a citizen of the state [of Kentucky.]" "
44 1 N.Y. (Cole. Cas.) 32-33 (1797).

45 2 N.Y. (2 Cai. R.) 418 (1804).
46 Ibid.
47

Smith, Admision to the Bar in New York, 16 YALE L. J. 514-15

(1906).

Similar

rules governed the admission of solicitors in Chancery, with the additional provision that the
candidate had to pass a satisfactory examination before the Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor, or
any other officer of the court appointed by the Chancellor.
48 New Jersey, until 1839, retained the rank of serjeant. Cf. Chroust, The Legal Profession
in Colonial America, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 350, 363 (1958).
49 Cf. SMITH, op. cit. supra note 47, at 519. Jonathan Birch of Bloomington, Illinois,
recalled the circumstances of his "examination" for the Illinois bar by Abraham Lincoln, a
member of the board of examiners by appointment of the Supreme Court of Illinois. The
candidate found the examiner, Lincoln, in his hotel room, partly undressed, and so far as facilities permitted, taking a bath, which proceeded during the "examination": "Motioning me
to be seated, he began his interrogatories at once, without looking at me a second time to be
sure of the identity of his caller. 'How long have you been studying?' he asked. 'Almost two
years,' was my response. 'By this time, it seems to me,' he said laughingly, 'you ought to be
able to determine whether you have in you the kind of stuff out of which a good lawyer can
be made. What books have you read?' I told him, and he said it was more than he read
before he was admitted to the bar.... He asked me in a desultory way the definition of a
contract, and two or three fundamental. questions.... Beyond these meager inquiries ...

asked nothing more. As he continued his toilet, he entertained me with recollectionsof them characteristically vivid and racy -

of his early practice...

he

many

The whole proceeding

was so unusual and queer, if not grotesque, that I was at a loss to determine whether I was
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only one year of study was prescribed, while in South Carolina the applicant
had to pass an examination unless he had served four years as a clerk to a
practicing lawyer. Pennsylvania, by a rule of the Supreme Court issued in
1788, required either four years of clerkship and one year of practice in the
Court of Common Pleas; or three years of study and two years of practice as
well as an examination by two lawyers; or two years of clerkship or two years
of practice, as well as an examination, if the candidate had commenced his legal
studies after he had reached the age of twenty-one.
In many states the antagonism towards the lawyer went so far that almost
any one but a trained lawyer was regarded a fit person to sit on the bench.
Thus, it came about that even the higher courts in many jurisdictions were
manned by people who probably excelled in their patriotic zeal, but had little
or no training in the law. In New Hampshire, during the Revolution, Meschech
Weare, a theologian by profession, was Chief Justice of the Superior Court, and
Matthew Thornton, one of his two associates, was a physician by profession."
In 1782 Samuel Livermore became Chief Justice. According to tradition, he
was an independent of conventionality as any living being could
be. . . . He attached no importance to precedents, and to quote
any would invite his anger. . . . Even when gross inconsistency
marked his decisions . . . he was not disturbed, but merely replied
that 'Every tub must stand on its own bottom.' He frequently
cautioned the jury against 'paying too much attention to the
niceties of the law to the prejudice of justice.' He was firm in his
determination not to go back into the past for the quest of authorities; so he layed down the inflexible rule that all reports of a date
prior to the Declaration of Independence might be cited, not,
however, as authorities, but as enlightening.... 51
Jeremiah Mason recalls that Livermore had "no law learning himself ...
[and] did not like to be pestered with it at his court. ...
[L]aw books were
laughed out of court." 2 Brackenridge, an Associate Justice of the Supreme
court of Pennsylvania, according to Horace Binney,
despised the law, because he was utterly ignorant of it, and affected to value himself solely upon his genius and taste for literareally being examined at all or not.... [Hie wrote a few lines on a sheet of paper, and, enclosing it in an envelope, directed me to report with it to Judge Logan, another member of the
examining committee, at Springfield. The next day... I delivered the letter.... On reading
it, Judge Logan smiled, and, much to my surprise, gave me the required certificate without
asking a question beyond my age and residence, and the correct way of spelling my name.
The note from Lincoln said: 'My dear Judge: -The
bearer of this is a young man who
thinks he can be a lawyer. Examine him, if you want to. I have done so, and am satisfied.
He's a good deal smarter than he looks to be.'" WOLDMAN, LAWYER LINCOLN 153-54 (1936).
50 During the same period, Nathaniel Peabody and Jonathan Blanchard discharged the
duties of attorney general for New Hampshire, although neither of them had been trained in
the law. In 1791, Josiah Bartlett, a physician, became Chief Justice of New Hampshire.
Woodbury Langdon, a judge of the Supreme Court of New Hampshire at different periods from
1782 to 1791, was a merchant; and Timothy Farrar, who served from 1771 to 1803, originally
had studied for the ministry. See PLUmmR, THE LIFE OF WILLIAM PLUMER 152 (1857).
It
should be noted here that other states, too, made use of lay judges. In Rhode Island, for
instance, a blacksmith was judge of the highest state tribunal from 1814 to 1818, and from

1818 to 1826 the Chief Justice was a farmer. See POUND, THE SPnuT OF THE CoMMON LAW

113 (1921).
51 Corning, The Highest Court of Law in New Hampshire,State, 2 THE GREEN BAO 470 (1890).
52 CLARK, op. cit. supra note 39, at 28 (1917).
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ture.... He once said to me... 'Talk of your Cokes and Littletons,
I had rather have one spark of the ethereal fire of Milton than all
the learning of all the Cokes and Littletons that ever lived.' . ..
He hated Judge Yeates [ very good judge, and a first-rate Pennsylvania lawyer] to absolute loathing. If Chief Justice Tilghman had
not sat between them, I think that Brackenridge would sometimes... have spit in Yeates' face, from mere detestation... for
Yeates was vastly his superior in everything that deserves praise
among men. .. . It is not certain that Brackenridge was at all
times sane, and he would have3 been just as good a judge as he was
if he had been crazy outright.
In New York, John Sloss Hobart, an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, was not a lawyer, and the conditions prevailing at this court prior to
1804, the year James Kent became Chief Justice, were described as
very inefficient and unsatisfactory.... The cases that came before
the court were slightly examined both at the bar and on the
bench.... [T]alent and legal learning ... had not been applied
in that thorough, laborious and businesslike way so necessary to
give strength and character to the court and to the law.... 1The early courts of Vermont, we are told, "were badly organized and usually
filled with incompetent men."55 In New Jersey, Isaac Smith, a physician by
training, and Samuel Tucker, who had no particular training at all, were members of the Supreme Court, 6 while in Rhode Island, Tristam Burges, an orator
and professor of oratory, was Chief Justice from 1817 to 1818; and James Fenner, a person little qualified to perform judicial duties, and Charles Brayton, a
blacksmith by trade, were Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. Between 1819
and 1826 Isaac Wilbur, a farmer by profession, held the position of Chief
Justice. Samuel Randall, who was Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from
1822 to 1832, was admitted to the bar two years after his retirement from the
bench.57 Jeremiah Mason recollects that Lot Hall, a Justice of the Supreme
Court of Vermont, was "a man of ordinary natural talents, little learning, and
much industry." 5 8 John Louis Taylor, the first Chief Justice of North Carolina,
had only a smattering of a college education. For awhile he read law "without
preceptor or guide"; and he was admitted to the bar at the age of nineteen. 9
A judicial utterance, which is perhaps most characteristic of this period,
was made by John Dudley, a trader and farmer by profession,. who, between
1785 and 1797, Was also an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire." He addressed the jury:
Gentlemen, we have heard what has been said in this case by
the lawyers, the rascals. . . .They talk of law. Why, gentlemen,
53

THE LIFE OF HoRAcE BINNEY 40 (1903).
BARNARD, DISCOURSE ON THE LIFE, CHARACTER AND PUBLIC SERVICES OF AMBROSE
SPENCER 46 (1849).
BINNEY,

54
55
56
57

CLARK, op. cit. supra note 39, at 22.
Whitehead, The Supreme Court of New Jersey, 3 THE GREEN BAG 401, 402, 404 (1891).
Edwards, The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, 2 THE GREEN BAG 525, 531, 532,
533 (1890). See also POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 113 (1921).
58 CLAR, op. cit. supra note 39, at 19.

59 Clark, The Supreme Court of North Carolina, 4 THE GREEN BAG 457, 461 (1892).
60 PLUMER, op. cit. supra note 50, at 150-56 (1857). Plumer said about Dudley
that he 'had not only no legal education but little learning of any kind. But he had a dis-
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it is not law what we want, but justice! They would govern us
by the common law of England. Common-sense is a much safer
guide ....

A clear head and an honest heart are worth more than

all the law of the lawyers. There is one good thing said at the
bar from Shakspeare [sic], - an English player, I believe ...
It is our duty to do justice between the parties, not by any quirks
of the law out of Coke or Blackstone, - books that I never read
and never will.

61

The bar, confronted with such an unprofessional bench, was frequently
compelled to adapt itself to these conditions, very much to the detriment of its
own professional standards.
It should be borne in mind that the first state governments were largely
characterized by what has been called "legislative supremacy." The will of the
people in many instances was considered omnipotent, and the legislature was
simply looked upon as the chief organ of this omnipotent popular will. Hence
the earlier state legislatures did not hesitate to interfere with the traditional
functions of the courts. They enacted statutes reversing judgments of the courts
in particular cases; 2 they attempted to admit to probate wills previously rejected by the courts on good legal grounds;63 and they sought to dictate the
details of administration of particular estates.6" By special laws they validated
particular invalid marriages,6" and they attempted to exempt a particular wrongdoer from liability for a particular wrong for which his neighbors would be
held liable by the general law as administered by the courts.66 They suspended
criminating mind, a retentive memory, a patience which no labor could tire, and integrity
proof alike against threats and flattery, and a free elocution, rude indeed, and often uncouth,
but bold, clear and expressive, with a warmth of honest feeling which was not easy to resist."
Ibid. at 153. Theophilus Parsons, an outstanding lawyer of the time, maintained, however,
that Dudley was "the best judge I ever knew in New Hampshire"; and Arthur Livermore,
another able lawyer, was of the opinion that "justice was never better administered in New
Hampshire, than when the judges knew very little of what we lawyers call law." PLUMER,
op. cit. supra, at 155-56. William Plumer observes that some of the lay judges were not only
prone to disregard the known principles of the lav, but were inclined in some instances to
mete out a very uncertain product of their own: "So much, indeed, was the result supposed to
depend upon the favor or aversion of the courts, that presents were not uncommon, nor perhaps,
unexpected." Ibid. at 150.
61 Corning, op. cit. supra note 51, at 470. See also note, 40 AMERICAN LAW REVIE W
Compare this statement with what one of the delegates to the Indiana Con436-37 (1906).stitutional Convention of 1850 said: "I have been a lawyer for some years, and I have no
hesitation in telling gentlemen that I never studied Latin; and I will tell them further, that
any man who studies Latin for the purpose of making himself a lawyer, is a fool for his pains."
2 REPORTS OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR THE REVISION OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA

1136 (1850).

Justice Miller is reported to

have pointed out that the prime factor in shaping the law in our Western states was ignorance:
the first judges "did not know enough to do the wrong thing, so they did the right thing."
During the debates of the
POUND, THE FORMATIVE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW 11 (1938).
Indiana Constitutional Convention of 1850, a speaker quoted a judge as having said: "During
the fifteen years that I have practiced law, I can say, with safety, that not one-half of the
suits with which I was familiar, were decided upon their merits, or upon principles of sub-

2 REPORTS OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION FOR
THE REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF INDIANA 1738 (1850).

stancial justice."
62

See Preface to 1 Chip. No. 4, 5, 21-25 (Vt.) (1792); 2 Root (Conn.) 350 (1796);

Calder v.Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385 (1798); Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199 (1818);
Hamilton v.Hempsted, 3 Conn. 332 (Day 1809).
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64
65
66

Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 385 (1798).
Leland v. Wilkinson, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 206, 207 (1832).
Local Laws of Ind., 1842, ch. 140 at 130.
Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396 (1814); 5 Watts and Sergeant 171 (Pa. 1843); Local

Laws of Ind., 1839, ch. 75 at 158.
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the statute of limitations for a particular litigant in one case,"' and they dispensed
with, for particular and specified litigants, the statutory requirements for bringing suit for divorce. 8 Subordination of the courts to the "appellate jurisdiction"
of the legislature (or the governor), as a matter of fact, was not uncommon in
the early history of the United States. In some instances the judiciary was considered simply "a subordinate department of the government." 9 In colonial
days, it will be remembered, appellate jurisdiction rested with the king and
council. When the first state constitutions were adopted, courts of last resort
were established to assume this function." But in some states appellate jurisdiction was vested in the legislature or governor.7 '
Several factors other than popular resentment and low standards of admission to legal practice contributed to the deterioration or, as Pound puts it,72
to the "deprofessionalization" of the young American legal profession. Among
these factors were, first, the particular geographical conditions of the early
Republic as well as the primitive and often wholly inadequate means of communication between the various parts of the country.7" Many communities for
a long time were cut off from the more important centers of culture along the
East coast. Secondly, in keeping with the tendency to bring justice "to every
man's door," 4 a vast number of independent courts of general jurisdiction was
67

Holden v. James, 11 Mass. 396 (1814); Ogden v. Blackledge, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch)

162 (1804).

68 Local Laws of Ind., 1842, ch. 122 at 119, ch. 125 at 121.-In order to understand
this "legislative overbearance," it must be borne in mind that for a long time the legislature
had been the favorite of the early American. The colonial period left a long memory of conflicts in which the colonial legislatures spoke out against British arbitrariness. While the courts
and the executive had been creatures of the Crown, the legislative assemblies, as the champions
of the people's interests, had assumed the initiative in the gathering drive for independence.
Hence it is not surprising that the early state constitutions should grant the legislature sweeping
and, frequently, too sweeping powers "to make all laws which shall be deemed necessary."
As often as not, such broad grants of power simply swept away the formal separation of powers
among legislature, judiciary, and executive. In addition, the legislature rather than the courts
seemed to express more adequately the deeply ingrained localism in early American politicsthe notion that the natural unit representing the sovereign people was the local assembly which,
therefore, should have practically unlimited powers.
69 CHIPMAN, A MEMom OF THOMAS CHITTENDEN, 112 (1846).
70 Until 1835 Georgia did not have a Supreme Court. The people of Georgia apparently feared the power of lawyers and judges who, it was alleged, would be beyond popular
control if fortified by a supreme court. When in 1835 the Constitution of Georgia was amended,
provisions were made for a supreme judicial court. But not until ten years later was the necessary legislation enacted that put the Supreme Court into operation.
71 See generally, MATTHEWS,; AMERICAN STATE GOVERNIENT 430 (1924); Browne, The
New York Court of Appeals, 2 THE GREEN BAG 277, 278 (1890); Eaton, The Development
of the Judicial System in Rhode Island, 14 YALE L. J. 148, 153 (1905).-When the legislature could not be induced by the people to interfere with the courts, violent action was taken
against these courts in some instances as in Shay's Rebellion in Massachusetts, the Whiskey
Insurrection in Pennsylvania, and the anti-rent disorders in Eastern New York.
72 POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN TIMES 183 (1953).
73 The memoirs of many an early judge or lawyer "riding the circuit" give a vivid picture
of the dangers and inconveniences inherent in travel.
74 Under the provisions of the first Constitution of Ohio of 1802, for instance, members
of the Ohio Supreme Court were required to hold a term once a year in each county. Moses
Granger, one of the judges, points out that this provision kept the judges on horseback half
of the year: "Every lawyer-judge," Granger writes, "traveled many hundreds of miles each
year upon a circuit in which the best roads were very poor, and most of them almost impassable
Members of the county bar traveled with, or met, the judges, and lodged with
on wheels ....
or near them during term. The saddle-bag carried Ohio Statutes, then small in bulk, Blackstone's Commentaries, sometimes Coke on Littleton, sometimes a volume or two of an English
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established throughout the country. To each of these courts an independent
local bar was attached wherever feasible. These local bars, especially in the
"back country," on the whole lacked effective organization, discipline and professional competence. Every local court, as a rule, acting on its own discretion
and frequently without discrimination, admitted to practice all sorts of people,
irrespective of their moral and professional qualifications. After a certain number of years a person so admitted was considered qualified to practice before all
the state courts, including the highest court of the state.
This system of attaching distinctly local but wholly unorganized and
frequently unprofessional bars to each local court constituted a grave danger to
professional ideals, professional deportment and professional competence. Discipline by the courts, if ever invoked, was singularly inefficient, while discipline
by the profession itself or by a professional organization simply had ceased to
exist by that time. Reprehensible practices often remained unchecked, and the
question of competence was rarely if ever raised. At first, some influential local
bars, such as the bar organizations in eastern Massachusetts, which shortly before
the Revolution had achieved a high level of standards and discipline, tried to
stem the general tide of professional deterioration. Also, the so-called "circuit
bars," which accompanied the circuit courts in their travels from county to
county, at least for a while had a wholesome and restraining effect upon the
disorganized local bars by keeping alive or by kindling a professional spirit. But
in the face of the general trend towards "deprofessionalization" and its concomitants, such as the universal lowering of educational requirements and indiscriminate admission to practice, these efforts proved to be in vain. Hence, the years
following the Revolution might also be called the period of an unsuccessful

struggle of the legal profession to preserve its pre-Revolutionary attainments. As
time went on, the pernicious institution of the "habitual client-caretaker" developed, especially in the larger Eastern urban centers. This type of practitioner,
which also included the habitual criminal lawyer, did little to enhance the reputation of the profession. Neither courts nor the opinion of the honorable members
of the unorganized and, hence, powerless bar, were able to cope effectively with
the reprehensible methods and performances of these men. This general situation, besides having its effects on the common law, inevitably caused the complete breakdown of the traditional English distinction between barrister and
attorney (or solicitor), a distinction which, however, had been to some degree
rejected by the colonies before the Revolution. Aside from the expense inherent
in such a differentiation, the relatively small number of lawyers that was to be
found after the Revolution could not successfully have been divided into barristers and attorneys; and the fusion between these two branches of the profession became a permanent feature of legal practice in the United States. As
a matter of fact, the English attorney or solicitor, rather than the barrister,
became the model for the American legal practitioner. But the English attorney
or solicitor of that time, whom the newly emerging American bar to a large
law or equity report, and a small 'vade mecum' legal treatise the name of which is now known
to few of our profession." Quoted in AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM:
SOME SELECTED PHASES 154-55 (1940).
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extent imitated, lacked an efficient professional organization, and the tradition
of professional responsibility which such an organization engenders.
The widespread irritation among people who attributed all their economic
and social troubles to lawyers, together with a deeply rooted hostility to everything British, led, as might be expected, to a strong and lasting sentiment against
the common law of England, which during the eighteenth century had gradually asserted itself as the law of the colonies. The antagonism against the
common law probably became more pronounced during the so-called Jeffersonian
era, a period in American history which in its dislike of everything British seems
to have favored everything French, including the promulgation of a radically
new code
of laws fashioned after the recently introduced French Code Napo5
7

lion.

One of the specific reasons for the public distrust of the existing laws was
the intricacies and technicalities of the English common law. Special pleading,
which had been introduced in England durimg the eighteenth century, Latin,
French, and other terms unfamiliar to the laymen, were generally regarded as
tricky devices to mislead and despoil ordinary people.sa William Duane of
Philadelphia, attacking the "mysterious" and "unintelligible" common law of
his day, was of the opinion that it was invented and kept in force by the lawyers
solely for the purpose of preventing the non-initiated from acquiring any knowledge of the law. He suggested that the law be so simplified as to enable everyone
to be his own lawyer: "Law would soon become a part of academic study....
By this means society would be prodigiously advanced in knowledge.
Benjamin Austin lamented that:
One reason of the pernicious practice of the law and what gives
great influence to the 'order' [of lawyers], is that we have introduced the whole body of English law into our courts. Why should
these States be governed by British laws? Can the monarchical and
aristocratic institutions of England be consistent with the republican
principles of our Constitution? The precedents brought from 'old
English authorities' ..

.answer no other purpose than to increase

the influence of lawyers.7
To be sure, there existed a number of lawyers, at least on the eve of the
Revolution, who fiercely resisted every legal reform, and who regretted the fact
that Blackstone's Commentaries,which made their appearance in the colonies just
before the Revolution, should simplify and arrange the law of England in such a
75 The Anti-Federalists, who were not only hostile toward England and English institutions,
but also interested in reforming existing practice and procedure, were inclined to urge the
reception of French law. Gratitude to France for her timely assistance during the Revolution
was at a high point during these years, and great interest was displayed in the language, literature, fashions, and manners of the French people. It is no wonder, therefore, that French
law and French legal authorities were given high standing in many quarters, and frequently
found their way into the earlier American reports. "In our courts of justice the writings of
the civilians are referred to freely. .. ." Anonymous, 21 NORTH AMERICAN RnviEw 387-88
(1925). Pound has pointed out that the first volume of Johnson's Reports of decisions in the
New York Supreme Court of Error for the year 1806 contains a number of citations from
French legal authorities. Pound, The Place o1 Judge Storey in the Making of American Law,
48 Am. L. Rnv. 676, 685 (1914).
75a See also 2 REPoRTs OF THE DEBATEs, etc. quoted in note 61, supra, at 1128.
76 Duane, op. cit. supra note 31, at 36-42.
77 Benjamin Austin (Honestus), quoted in WARREN, op. cit. supra note 30, at 228.
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manner that even laymen could acquire a modicum of legal knowledge without
undue effort.
While the "moderates" agreed that the English common law which had
developed subsequent to the American Revolution, should be wholly ignored,

the "radicals" expostulated that only the English law as it existed prior to the
fourth year of the reign of James I (the year 1607) " should have binding force.
The "extremists," on the other hand, insisted that the whole of the English
common law prior to the Revolution had no validity in the United States, except
those provisions which expressly had been adopted by the various state con-

ventions, by statute or by court decisions. Jefferson, for instance, maintained
that the American colonists asserted against the British Crown not "the rights
of Englishmen," but "the rights of man"; and he seriously doubted the propriety
of quoting in American courts English authorities subsequent to the emigration,
that is, subsequent to the year 1607. Some "extremists" even went so far as to
suggest the complete abolishment Cf the common law in its entirety: "As soon as
we cut asunder the legatures that bound us together ...the common law was
done away.

.

.""

It was urged, for instance, that the Virginia courts abandon

the practice of quoting British decisions, because it was thought to be unbecoming
for a free republican government to be administered by principles "of a
rigid and high toned monarchy." " At the same time the hope was expressed
that "substituting acts" would soon be passed by the people enabling them to
"shake off this last seeming badge [the common law of England] and mortifying
momento of their dependence on her [scil. England]." 8 In sum, nothing less
was proposed than that "wholesome" statutes, enacted by patriotic American
legislatures, would eradicate "this engine of oppression," namely, the common
law of England, from the American soil.
Some states, such as Delaware, 82 Maryland,8 ' Massachusetts,' New Hampshire,"5 , New York, 8 New Jersey 7 and Rhode Island, 8 in their state constitutions
expressly stipulated that only those parts of the common law as had been de-

veloped after the year 1775 or 1776, or after the adoption of the respective state
constitutions should be in force, unless otherwise indicated. In other states, such
as North Carolina, for instance, the common law of England, so far as it was
applicable and not inconsistent with the Constitution or the laws of the United
States, or of any individual state, was adopted and declared to be in force by
special statute. Other states, again, debated at great length the extent to which
the English common law, if at all, was still applicable in American courts - debates which are reminiscent of the discussions once carried on in the early Amer78. Cf. Short v. Stotts, 58 Ind. 29, 32 (1877); Penny v. Little, 3 Ili. 301, 302 (Scammon
1841). The date of 1607 was chosen because this year was regarded as the year in which the
Virginia Colony was founded.
79 Quoted in WARREN, op. cit. supra note 30, at 226.
80. Ibid.
81 Ibid. at 226-27.
82 Constitution of 1776, art. 25.
83 Declaration of Rights of 1776, art. 3.
84 Constitution of 1780, chap. 6, art. 6.
85 'Constitution of 1792, part 2, sec. 90.
86 Constitution of 1777, art. 35; Constitution of 1846, art. 1, sec. 17.
87 Constitution of 1776, art. 22.
88 Constitution of 1842, art. 14, sec. 1.
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ican colonies over the same issue.89 In these states the adoption of the English
common law frequently had to await some authoritative declaration by the
courts. In the main, however, they followed the somewhat vague policy of
accepting only those parts of the common law which they considered suited to
the changed conditions and circumstances. Hence, nearly everywhere the
common law was not adopted in its .entirety, and it was left to judicial decisions
as well as to the usages and customs of the respective states to determine how far
the common law had been introduced and sanctioned:
The common law so far as it is applicable to our situation and government has been recognized and adopted as one entire system by
the Constitutions of Massachusetts, New York, New Jersey and
Maryland. It has been assumed by the courts of justice or declared
by statute, with the like modifications, as the law of the land, in
every state. It was imported by our colonial ancestors, as far as it
was applicable, and was sanctioned by royal charter and colonial
statutes. It is also the established doctrine that English statutes
passed before the emigration of our ancestors, and applicable to our
situation, and in amendment of the law, constitute a part of the
common law of this country.9 0
Justice Chase seems to sum up this whole situation when he states: 9
[E]ach colony judged for itself, what parts of the common law were
applicable to its new condition; and in various modes, by legislative acts, by judicial decisions, or by constant usage, adopted some
parts, and rejected others. Hence, he who shall travel through the
different states, will soon discover, that the whole of the common
law of England has been nowhere introduced; that some states have
rejected what others have adopted; and that there is, in short, a
great and essential diversity, in the subjects to which the common
law is applied, as well as in the extent of its application. The
common law, therefore, of one state, is not the common law of another; but the common law of England
is the law of each state,
92
so far as each state has adopted it.
The general aversion to the traditional coihmon law of England in some
instances assumed specific forms. In 1800, the General Assembly of Virginia
instructed its senators and representatives in Congress to "oppose the passing of
any law founded on recognizing the principle lately advanced that the common
law of England is in force under the Government of the United States."9 "
Governor Tyler of Virginia found it most inappropriate that "the time of the
court... [should be] taken up in reconciling absurd and contradictory opinions
of foreign judges which certainly can be no part of an American judge's
duty...."
In 1799, New Jersey enacted a statute forbidding the bar under
heavy penalty to cite in court any decision, opinion, treatise, compilation or
exposition of the common law made or written in England after July 1, 1776." 5
89
65-68,
90
91
92
93
94
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Cf. Chroust, The Legal Profession in Colonial America, 33 NOTRE DAME LAW. 51-54,
87-88, 92, 94 (1957).
1 KENT, COMMENTARES 472.
United States v. Worrall, 2 U. S. (2 Dali.) 333, 341 (1798).
Cf. Gatton v. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co., 95 Iowa 112, 116, 63 N. W. 589, 590 (1895).
WAREN, op. cit. supra note 30, at 231.
Ibid. at 226.
Acts of June 13, 1799, see. 7, PATTERSON, LAWS OF NEW JERSEY 438.
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In Pennsylvania, in the year 1805, Edward Shippen, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and two Associate Justices, Thomas Smith and Jasper Yeates,
were impeached for an "arbitrary and unconstitutional act," namely, for having
fined and jailed Thomas Passmore for "constructive contempt." 9 It was alleged
that punishment for contempt was a form of barbarism sanctioned by the English
common law but wholly unsuited to this country, and hence, illegal. The three
justices were declared acquitted, however, since the prosecution failed by three
It appears, therefore, that in Pennsylvotes to obtain a two-thirds majority."
vania the mere reliance of English law could cause the impeachment of a state
judge. In 1810 a statute was passed in Pennsylvania - not repealed until
the citation of any English decision handed down after
1836"9 -forbidding
July 4, 1776. Kentucky, in 1807, provided by statute that English Reports and
decisions prior to July 4, 1776, were not to be cited or considered in any of the
state courts;1"' and in Ohio as late as 1819 a pamphleteer declared that the
common law of England was not the law of the United States, and that it had
absolutely no authority in any of the states which were formed out of the old
Northwestern territory. Jefferson, in 1799, plainly rejected the idea that the
common law of England should be recognized and made enforceable in the
newly established federal courts. He called this idea an "audacious, bare-faced
and sweeping pretention," beyond the power of the federal courts. "If this
assumption be yielded to," Jefferson contends, "the State courts may be shut
up ... "'0' Some opposition to English precedents and English authorities may
also be explained as a crude effort on the part of many ill-trained lawyers, judges
and magistrates "to palliate [their] . . . lack of information by a show of
0 2
patriotism.'
96 Cf. Bayard v. Passmore, 3 Pa. 438 (Yeates 1802); Respublica v. Passmore, S Pa. 438
(Yeates 1802).
97 Thirteen of the twenty-four senators voted for conviction. See generally, HAMILTON,
REPORT OF THE TRIAL AND ACQUITTAL OF EDWARD SHIPPEN (1805).
98
99
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Act of March 19, 1810, PUBLIC LAWS 136.
Act of March 29, 1836, PUBLIC LAWS 224.

Act of February 12, 1808,

ACTS OF KENTUCKY

23 (1807).

In 1808 Henry Clay was

expressly prohibited from citing an English authority by the Supreme Court of Kentucky.
Hickman v. Boffman, 1 Ky. 356, 372 (Hardin 1808). Said the court: "In the argument of
The chief justice stopped
his cause, Clay offered to read, from 3 East's Reports, 199, 200 ....
him, and stated it was a violation of the act . . . that 'reports and books contained adjudged
cases, in the Kingdom of Great Britain, which decisions have taken place since the 4th day of
July, 1776, shall not be read, or considered as authority, in any of the courts of the commonwealth,' etc.... The books prohibited, ought not to be used at all. . . ." In a footnote on
page 373 reference is made to the case of Gallatin v. Bradford, fall term, 1808, where "the
court stopped counsel, who cited Douglass' reports... and declared it was improper for counsel
to refer to them." Incidentally, Justice Hughes and Wickliffe, in Hickman v. Boffman, 372-73,
state: "There are many books, which are not authority, but which ought to be read and
used, for the sound and clear reasoning they contain, as Pothier on Obligations." This would
indicate that Kentucky courts, too, at the time displayed a distinct preference for the "civilians"
and for French legal authorities in particular.
101 Letter of Thomas Jefferson to Edmund Randolph, dated August 18, 1799, 4 WRITINGS
OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 301, 302 (Washington ed., 1854).
102 POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW 116-17 (1921). Ralph Waldo Emerson, in
his Essay on Power, states that "a Western lawyer of eminence said to me, he wished it were
a penal offense to bring an English law book into a court in this country." CONDUCT OF LIFE
63 (1893 ed.). See also BALDWIN, THE AMERICAN JUDICIARY 114-15 (1905). Some of these
attitudes and measures, it must be conceded, were also occasioned by other considerations.
Thomas Jefferson, for instance, favored a rule prohibiting the citation of English authorities
after George III, because such a rule would eliminate "Mansfield's innovations" which he detested. I TYLER, THE LIFE AND TiMES OF THE TYLERS 265 (1884).
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This anti-common law trend caused much excitement and grave concern
among lawyers and justices alike. Many protests were made by both bench and
bar against the many steps taken to restrict, modify or abolish the common law.
Henry H. Brackenridge, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, in 1814, insisted that the Pennsylvania act of 1810, forbidding the citation of English cases and authorities subsequent to July 4, 1776, should be repealed without delay. He felt that this particular statute was unconstitutional on
its face in that it abridged the immemorial rights of.the courts to hear all reasons
and arguments of any issue before them.
The widespread aversion to and rejection of the traditional common law
of England which made itself felt after the Revolution also tended to leave the
courts and the lawyers without the guidance and systems of authoritative legal
materials. It has already been noted that a number of states legislated against
the citation of English decisions or authorities. At the same time practically no
contemporary American case was officially reported. When, for instance, James
Kent came to the bench in 1798, he found himself almost completely without
assistance from reported decisions of his predecessors on the New York bench.10 3
The legal uncertainty, even chaos, which this situation engendered was strongly
deplored by bench and bar. Lawyers no less than courts frequently had to rely
on vague and not always trustworthy recollections: "The United States have,
until within a few years, trusted to tradition the reasons for their judicial decisions. But... with more enlarged views of jurisprudence it became obvious,
that the exposition of our statutes and the validity of our customs should rest
upon a more secure basis than the memory of man or the silent influence of
unquestioned usage." ' 4 Cranch, in the preface to the first edition of his Reports
of 1804, laments: "Much of that uncertainty of the law which is'so frequently,
and perhaps so justly, the subject of complaint in this country, may be attributed
to the want of American rep6its." 105 And James Sullivan, in the preface to his
work on Land Titles, observed in 1801: "The want of accurate reports ... is
very discouraging.... It would be well for us... to have our own reporters .... "
Caine, in the preface to the first edition of his New York Reports, likewise deplores this situation:
The inconveniences resulting from the want of a connected system
of judicial reports have been experienced and lamented by every
member of that [legal] profession .... The determinations of the
court have been with difficulty extended beyond the circle of those
immediately concerned in the suits in which they were pronounced;
points adjudged have been often forgotten, and instances may be
adduced where those solemnly established, have, even by the bench,
been treated as new. If this can happen to those before whom every
subject of debate is necessarily agitated and determined, what must
be the state of the lawyer whose sole information arises from his
own practice, or the hearsay of others? Formed on books, the
doctrines of which have in many respects been wisely overruled, he
Cf. KENT, MEMOIRS AND LETTERS OF JAMES KENT 112-13 (1898).
104 Anonymous, Review of Tyng's MassachusettsReports, 1 AmmIcAN LAw

103

362 (1808).
105

1 Cranch (5 U. S.), Preface III (3d ed. 1911).
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frequently counseled without advice, and acted without
must have
10 6
a gaide.
In 1785, through the efforts of two prominent lawyers, Richard Law and
Roger Sherman, the State of Connecticut passed a statute requiring the judges
of the State Supreme Court and Superior Court to render written reasons for
their opinions whenever a legal issue was involved, so that they might be properly
reported.0 7 and thus a foundation be laid "for the more perfect and permanent
system of Common Law in this State."' 08 In 1789, Ephraim Kirby published
the first report, known as Kirby's Reports (one volume), in which he collected
the decisions of the Superior Court from 1785 to May, 1788, together with some
decisions of the Supreme Court of Errors. Subsequently, Jesse Root (Root's
Reports, in two volumes) reported cases from July, 1789 to 1798. In his preface,
Kirby states:
The uncertainty and contradiction attending the judicial decisions
in this state, have long been subjects of complaint. The source of
this complaint is easily discovered ....
[O]ur ancestors . . . brought
with them the notions of jurisprudence which prevailed in the country from whence they came. The riches, luxury, and extensive commerce of that country, contrasted with the equal distribution of
property, simplicity of manners, and agricultural habits and employments of this, rendered a deviation from the English laws, in
many instances, highly necessary. . . . Our courts were still in a
state of embarrassment, sensible that the common law of England
...
was not fully applicable to our situation; but no provision being
made to preserve and publish proper histories of their adjudications,
every attempt of the judges, to run the line of distinction, between
what was applicable and what not, proved abortive: For the
principles of their decisions were soon forgot, or misunderstood,
or erroneously reported from memory. Hence arose a confusion in
the determination of our courts.... 109
In 1790 Alexander Dallas published his first volume of reports on Pennsylvania cases; Nathaniel Chipman (Chipman's Reports) reported for Vermont in
1793; George Wythe published the Decisions of Cases in Virginia by the High
Court of Chanceryin 1795; and Francois Xavier Martin (Martin's Reports) reported for North Carolina in 1797. The first unofficial reports for the state of
New York, on the initiative of James Kent, were compiled by Coleman in 1801,
while the first official reports were those of George Caine, who had been appointed regular Reporter by the State Legislature in 1804. The first volume
(2 Dallas) of cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States was first
published by Alexander Dallas in 1798;... and in 1804 Cranch began the
publication of his Supreme Court Reports."' Other states gradually introduced
106 Preface to the First Edition (1804), 2 Cai. R. (N.Y.) 33 (Smith & Hitchcock, 1883).
See also KENT, op. cit. supra note 103, at 158: "I took to the court [sail., the Chancery Court]
(and] I had nothing to guide me ......
[..
107 Kirby's Reports (Conn.) Preface III-IV (ed. 1899).
108 Cf. Anonymous, American Reports and Reporters, 22 AMERICAN JURIST AND LAW
MAGAZINE 108 (1839).
109 Kirby's Reports (Conn.) Preface III (ed. 1899).
110 Dallas, in volumes 2-4, reported cases from the organization of the Supreme 'Court of
the United States in 1790 to the August term of 1800.
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a "reporter system" of their own: Kentucky (Hughes' Reports) in 1803,
Massachusetts (William's Reports, continued by the Tyng's Reports) in 1805,
Maryland (Harrisand McHenry's Reports) and South Carolina in 1809, Maine
(Greenlaf's Reports) in 1822, and New Hampshire (Adams' Reports) in 1819,
Georgia (T.U.P. Charlton's Reports) in 1824, and Delaware (Harrington's
Reports) in 1837."
In the hundred years between the publication in 1687 of

William Penn's gleanings from Lord Coke and the issuance of
the American editions of Buller's Nisi Prius and Gilbert's Evidence
in 1788, not a single book that could be called a treatise intended
for the use of professional lawyers was published in the British
Colonies and the American States. 1 3
The first American law treatises published after 1788 owed their origin
largely to the general demand for "native" legal texts to be used by practitioners
of all sorts. The first legal texts which appeared after 1788 dealt with pleading, 1 4 real property, maritime law or maritime insurance, and a few scattered
works on some special subjects. Of more than local importance was Zephaniah
Swift's A System of the Laws of the State of Connecticut,published in 1795-1796.
Four general comprehensive works on law were also published during this period,
namely, The Reports and Dissertations (1793) of Nathaniel Chipman, Chief
Justice of Vermont; St. George Tucker's edition of Blackstone's Commentaries
of 1803, which had a widespread circulation; the lectures on law which were
delivered in 1804 at the College of Philadelphia by James Wilson, Associate
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States; and Law Miscellanies (1814)
by Hugh Brackenridge, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Also, Blackstone's original Commentaries were still much in use throughout the
United States. But most of the earliest American law texts were clearly infirst volume of the Supreme Court Reports: "Gentlemen of the profession throughout the
United States are much indebted to the industry and learning of Mr. Cranch.... We are
happy to state that these reports have been compiled with the utmost attention to accuracy
and that the learned reporter will continue them under proper encouragement.... We feel
sanguine then that this specimen may operate as an incentive to legal gentlemen in different
parts of the Union towards lending their aid to similar publications. By the proper exertion
in this way, we may expect to see a code of Common Law arising out of our own Constitutions, laws, customs and state of society, independent of that servile recourse to the decisions
of foreign Judicatures to which, since our revolution, we have been too much accustomed." By an Act of March 22, 1816, provision was made for the first time for an official publication
of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States, but with no provision for a salary
for the Reporter. Not until March 14, 1834, was there any order that all opinions of the
Supreme Court must be filed with the Clerk.
112 In a very short time, however, an astonishing number of reported cases became available to the general public. It has been estimated that by the year 1822 there existed about one
hundred and forty volumes of American reports. The rate in increase was so rapid that by
1824 complaints were made concerning the "vast and increasing multiplications of reports as
well as law treatises." Anonymous, 9 NORTH AMnRICAN REVIEW 377 (1824). More realistic
observers, on the other hand, hailed this development as one of the most significant steps in
American jurisprudence. They asserted that it would substantially improve the quality of the
law; that it would help the promulgation of the law; that it was of inestimable importance to
the protection of individual rights; and that it compelled the judiciary to adhere to a more
regular and efficient administration of justice. Some of these arguments were expressed in the
NORTz
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113 James, A List of Legal Treatises Printed in the British Colonies and the American
States before 1801, HAAVARD LEGAL ESSAYS 159 (1934).
114 The most famous treatise on pleadings was probably Joseph Story's A Selection of
Pleadings in Civil Cases, published in 1805.
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tended for the use of laymen; they were largely manuals for petty offices, justices
of the peace, town officers and the like."' Hence, they were of little value to
the professional lawyer or judge. This dearth of reliable authoritative legal
materials and guides, in turn, compelled the lawyer to resort to English texts,
and, frequently, to English reports, even though these sources had practically
been outlawed in some states.
It is not surprising, therefore, that during this period a number of English
law books and law texts were republished or re-edited, such as Jones' Essay on
the Law of Bailments, Kyd's Treatise on the Law of Bills of Exchange and
ProMissoryNotes, and Park's System of the Law of Maritime Insurance. Much
of Joseph Storey's early literary activity was dedicated to the re-editing of leading
English law texts, such as Chitty's Bills and Notes in 1809. But it took some
time before the bench or the bar had an adequate body of legal authorities,
especially American authorities, adapted to the new conditions, to be used as
consistent and reliable guides during the earliest stages in the formative era of
American law and jurisprudence. In the meantime American lawyers were
compelled mainly to rely on "the memory of man and the silent influence of
unquestioned usage." 6 Naturally, they could always fall back on, and frequently had to rely upon, Blackstone's Commentariesof which the first (colonial)
American edition appeared in the year 1771.
It has been pointed out that the American Revolution and the novel socioeconomic conditions that it created, on the whole had an adverse effect on the
American legal profession, which before the Revolution had achieved real prominence. Within this post-war period, however, we can also notice important
signs of coming growth and vigor: in fact, the period between the years 1789
and 1835, in a way, may be called the "formative era" or, perhaps even, the
"golden age" or American law and the American legal profession.'1
During the formative era of American law the applicability of traditional
(mostly English) authoritative materials to the specific American circumstances
was the main concern of American courts and American lawyers. This applicability constitutes the paramount criterion by which American courts and
American lawyers determined whether certain English rules, documents or
institutions had been received or had to be received, and in case they were found
not to be applicable, what should obtain in their place. There existed no rules
defining applicability; nor was there a traditional technique of receiving the law
of one country and making it the law of another. Hence, what the early American courts did, and what the early American lawyers tried to argue, was the
determination of what was applicable and what was not applicable to the
specific American condition by constant reference to an idealized picture of a
pioneer, rural and agricultural society. In a way this idealized picture became an
essential part of American law, often expressed in such abstract terms as "the
nature of American institutions" or "the nature of American government." It
was used by courts and lawyers alike to reject those parts of the English law
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which they found inconvenient."' Therefore, the most pressing problem during
the formative era of American law was to work out and lay down certain rules
- to create an apparatus of legal precepts equal to the requirements of early
American life. This basic problem determined the American system of courts,
the American judicial organization, and to a large degree the course of American legal development for about three-quarters of a century. It was less important, therefore, to decide particular cases "justly" than to work out sound,
consistent and abstractly "just" rules. The chief concern of the early American
courts was the development and stabilization of a body of laws in each jurisdiction by means of judicial decisions; and the function of ascertaining and
declaring the law came to be the most important activity of the court." 9
After the year 1789, the growth of American law was largely due to great
lawyers and great judges. The creative legal achievements of these men will
bear favorable comparison with the great legal accomplishments of any age in
Western history. Within a relatively short span of time the English common law
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was made over into a common law
for America. It should be borne in mind that the bases of the American rules
in real property, contracts, sales of goods, torts, equity and conflicts of laws, to
mention only the staple fields of law, substantially were laid in the period
between 1810 and 1850. The War of 1812, while of questionable political
significance, had far reaching effects upon American economic and legal history
in that it gave rise not only to the rapid development of law in general, but
stimulated the growth of the many branches of modem law. It gave great
impetus to the expansion of admiralty and prize law, as well as to maritime
insurance law. 2
The development of early manufacturing stimulated the

118 Id. at 96-97; Pound, The Ideal Element in American Judicial Decision, 45 HARv. L.
Rxv. 136, 142-43, 147 (1931).
119 Cf. POUND, THnE FORMATIVE ERA OF AmERICAN LAw 102-04 (1938).
120 William Pinkney's fame as a lawyer, for instance, primarily rests on his great constitutional arguments. But it should not be overlooked that he made a lasting contribution to the
development of (American) international law, admiralty law and prize law. This aspect of
legal practice originally was little known in the United States. See The Dos Hernanos, 15 U.S.
(2 Wheat.) 37, 39 (1817), where Joseph Story stated: "This court scil., the Supreme Court of
the United States] cannot but watch with considerable solicitude irregularities, which so materially impair the simplicity of prize proceedings ....

Some apology . .. may be found in the

fact, that from our being long at peace no opportunity was afforded to learn the correct practice
in prize causes. But that apology no longer exists." See also Story's letter to Sir William Scott,
later Lord Stowell, dated January 14, 1819: "The Admiralty Law was in a great measure
a new system to us; and we had to grope our way as well as we could by the feable and indistinct light which glimmered through allusions incidentaly made to the known rules and proceedings of an ancient court. Under these circumstances, every case, whether of practice or
principle, was required to be reasoned out, and it was scarcly allowable to promulgate a rule
without at the same time expounding its confomity to the usages of Admiralty tribunals." 1
STORY, LIFE AND LETTERS OF JOSEPH STORY 318 (1851). It was largely with the aid of the
learning and legal arguments of such great lawyers as William Pinkney, William Wirt, Daniel

Webster, Samuel Dexter, Joseph Hopkinson, Henry Wheaton, John Sergeant, David B. Ogden
and William H. Winder between 1815 and 1822 that John Marshall and Joseph Story were
enabled to create and embody in a masterly series of opinions a distinctly American conception
of international law, admiralty law and prize law. It should also be borne in mind that many
of the most prominent lawyers of this period made their first appearance before the Supreme
Court of the United States in prize or admiralty cases: Pinkney in 1806 in Manella, Pujas &
Co. v. James Barry, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 249 (1806); Joseph Hopkinson in 1807 in Rhinelander

v. Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 18 (1807); John Sergeant in 1816
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growth of corporation law and patent law. Since the traditional coastal trade
was threatened by the British blockade, internal lines of communications, such
as turnpikes, canals (andl soon railroads) had to be constructed. These novel
conditions and developments, needless to say, further expanded the range of law;
they also stimulated the practice, scope and importance of the legal profession.
It may also be noted here that the legal profession in the early United
States was never a "class" determined by family lineage. The closest approach
to such a "class" based on inheritance can be detected in pre-Revolutionary

Virginia, South Carolina, New York and probably Massachusetts. In Virginia
South Carolina the landed and wealthy aristocracy made it a practice to
send their sons to the Inns of Court in London. In Massachusetts we can see the
beginnings of a self-perpetuating and somewhat closed class of "Harvard lawyers." New York, like some other cities, had a number of men "born to the
law" or bred in it, such as the Livingstons. But in the main the leading lawyers
both before and after the Revolution came from the middle class or upper-middle
class. Such men as the Livingstons or Jays of New York, the Randolphs of
Virginia or the Carrolls of Maryland, on the other hand, belonged to the upper
level of American society. As time progressed, the American legal profession
drew its members all the way from the lower middle class to the top of the
social hierarchy: the poor immigrant or immigrant's son and the small-farmer's
boy no less than the scion of the prosperous and prominent land owner and
merchant aspired to the bar. The American legal profession has always been,
and still is, one of the main avenues of self-advancement for ambitious young
men; and many leaders of the early American bar came from a background that
was socially modest, though often above average in culture.
The post-Revolutionary era was a time when lawyers spoke and acted with
that conscious and emphatic authority which is characteristic of truly creative
founders and promotors of public institutions and legal politicies. But in so doing
they did not act with a belligerent or frantic dogmatism so often found among
men who consider themselves mere agents of a condition to whose fortunes their
own are irrevocably committed. Aside from many official contributions to
public welfare and political life, the cumulative though unofficial services which
the legal profession rendered the country in the promotion of vital causes are
beyond estimate. 121 The early American lawyers, it appears, played their most
prominent role as advocates or "special pleaders": the leaders of the bar were
trial lawyers.' 22 This fact alone determined their dominant interest. They were

-and

in The Aurora, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 45 (1816); Henry Wheaton in 1816 in The Antonia
Johanna, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 74 (1816); Daniel Webster in 1814 in The St. Lawrence, 12
U.S. (8 Cranch) 268 (1814), and The Grotius, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 282 (1814) and William
Wirt in 1817 in The Fortuna, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 76 (1817). Associate Justice James M.
Wayne, in the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 300, 460-61 (1849), stated: "The case of
Gibbons v. Ogden .. . will always be a high and honorable proof of the eminence of the American bar of that day ....
There were giants in those days.. . ." It is commonly said that John
Marshall in his opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), was greatly
endebted to the splendid argument made by Daniel Webster. Webster himself said later that
"the opinion of the court, as rendered by the chief justice, was little else than a recital of my
argument. The Chief Justice told me that he had little to do than to repeat that argument...."
HARVEY, REMINISCENCES AND ANECDOTES OF WEBSTER 142
121 Cf. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 336-38

122

Ibid. at 302.

(1877).
(1950), and ibid. at 352-53; 366.
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concerned nearly exclusively with "the law" at the expense of "the facts." Admittedly, "facts" were probably simpler then because the usual pattern of daily life
was itself simpler and not yet complicated by involved social and economic
problems of great and perhaps overwhelming magnitude. Early American law,
in the main, dealt with situations that could be spelled out in terms of "manto-man relations." The lawyer was not yet preoccupied with complex "packagedeals," nor was he confronted with the forlorn sense of helplessness that grips
the modem individual in the face of major social, political or economic events.
Neither was he conscious of the possibility that the public at large might be
concerned with matters "private" in origin. He was completely absorbed in
devising and manipulating general legal principles and novel doctrines of law;
and his interest remained focused on the problem of adapting these principles
to the social conditions of a new society. This might also explain the lawyer's
neglect, bordering on disdain, of investigating facts which he believed to be of
little or no meaning to anyone but the parties.12 And finally, it was only natural
that men - lawyers - who had constantly to assume the responsibility of
making important decisions should be highly self-conscious individualists in their
professional attitudes. This individualism was deeply rooted in the social, economic and political thinking of the time: individualism was predominant in a
society where each person primarily was bent on self-advancement and gain in
the hectic exploitation of a new continent and its vast resources.
One of the most remarkable phenomena of the post-Revolutionary period,
it has been shown, was the publication of American law reports. The appearance
of the first printed reports, state and federal alike, with their lasting effects upon
future generations of lawyers, happily coincided with the ascendency of such
outstanding lawyers, presiding over the highest state courts, as James Kent (New
York), Theophilus Parsons (Massachusetts), William Tilghman (Pennsylvania),
Henry W. DeSaussure (South Carolina) and Jeremiah Smith (New Hampshire).
It is also fortunate that during this crucial era of growth and consolidation of
American law, the Supreme Court of the United States, under the leadership of
John Marshall, adhered to a fairly steady legal policy."' But perhaps even more
decisive was the fact that a small but efficient core of brilliant lawyers had
successfully weathered through the Revolution and the trying post-Revolutionary
123 See, for instance, BINNEY, op. cit. supra note 53, at 71 (1903): ". . . the lawyer's facts
are unproductive of all benefits, except to the fortunate client ....
the facts are of no more
importance to the lawyer himself than last year's price of calicoes, nor to the rest of mankind.
. . . They are forgotten as soon as the verdict is given, and well for the lawyer is it that they
can be forgotten."
124 Aside from the four Chief Justices who served on the highest Federal Bench, namely,
John Jay (resigned in 1795), John Rutledge (who was never confirmed by the Senate), Oliver
Ellsworth (appointed in 1796, resigned in 1799) and John Marshall (1801-1835), the following Associate Justices served on the highest Federal Bench: John Blair (resigned in 1796),
John Rutledge (resigned in 1791), Thomas Johnson (1792-1793) who took the place of John
Rutledge, James Wilson (died in 1798), William Cushing (1789-1810), James Iredell (died in
1799), Samuel Chase (1796-1811) who succeeded John Blair, William Paterson (1793-1806)
who took the place of Thomas Johnson, Alfred Moore (1799-1804) who replaced James Iredell,
Bushrod Washington (1798-1829) who took the place of James Wilson, William Johnson (18041834) who took the place of Alfred Moore, Henry Brockholst Livingston (1806-1823) who succeeded William Paterson, Joseph Story (1811-1845) who succeeded William Cushing, and
Thomas Todd of Kentucky (1807-1826), the new sixth Associate Justice.
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years. They managed to preserve and carry on the high professional standards
and accomplishments of the late colonial bar. The Revolution itself as well as
the many challenges and problems of the post-Revolutionary period had called
forth the greatest efforts on the part of lawyers. It was a sign of greatness that
the budding American legal profession on the whole met these challenges successfully and enthusiastically.

